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Transactional Economics
John Dewey’s Ways of Knowing and  
the Radical Subjectivism of the Austrian School
Robert Mulligan
Only the road and the dawn, the sun, the wind, and the rain,
And the watchfire under the stars, and sleep, and the road again.
—John Masefield (1878–1967), “The Seekers” (1923:52–53)
Abstract
The radical subjectivism of the Austrian school of economics is a special case of 
Dewey’s ways of knowing. Austrian economists adopted an Aristotelian deductive 
approach to economic issues such as social behavior and exchange. In Dewey’s 
contrasting view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the 
scientific community, offering more profound insight or more efficacious practical 
applications. Alternative ways of knowing which do not offer practical or intellectual 
benefits are to be rejected. Dewey’s transactional strategy, asserting knowledge as 
ways of knowing, suggests a broader and more fundamental critique of the socialist 
position in the calculation debate. The arguments presented by the Austrian school 
can be reformulated in terms of Dewey’s transactional philosophy.
Introduction
John Dewey’s most distinctive philosophical doctrine is the substitution of “in-
quiry” for “truth” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:196). Intellectual activity focuses not 
on the outcome but on the process of constructing “warranted assertions.”1 As with 
Masefield’s “seekers,” the journey is as important as the destination (Dewey 1938c); 
in transactional philosophy, the means and hypothesized end are equally important 
and co-defining aspects within inquiry.2 Dewey criticizes the traditional, ontologic 
notion of truth in which each item of knowledge is immutable, perfect, and final 
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:189). In contrast, Dewey views thought as an evolution-
ary process (Russell 1945:772), a view known as pragmatism or instrumentalism 
(Blanshard 1962:31). The idea of truth embodied in the scientific method, that 
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all explanations are tentative (Dewey 1925:9), seems to be one of Dewey’s start-
ing points (Handy and Harwood 1973:11–20). Most scientists and philosophers, 
however, believe in an ultimate fixed destination for human inquiry—an onto-
logic absolute. 
Dewey goes beyond them in rigor, if not always in formalism, because he ac-
knowledges we cannot be sure about the finality of any truth we aim to uncover. 
Until we can establish that ontological truth does exist—a rather tall order as long 
as we remain fundamentally ignorant of its content—we are not entitled to assume 
its existence, or for that matter that it may have any particular content. Dewey 
emphasizes further that the meaning of knowledge is context-dependent (Dewey 
and Bentley 1949:137). Dewey prefers the expression “belief” to “knowledge,” to 
emphasize its tentative nature. He also recommends the expression “warranted as-
sertion” in place of “truth” (Dewey 1938b:7, Dewey and Bentley 1949:165) to divest 
the subjects of inquiry of their purportedly ontologic character. 
Dewey’s philosophy can be applied in the social sciences, and particularly in 
economics, to clear methodological roadblocks and deepen our understanding of 
economic reality. As suggested above, this appeal to Deweyan transactional strategy 
should be viewed as an appeal to higher rigor, rather than a retreat from rigorous 
reasoning. This paper will discuss the applicability of Dewey’s approach to several 
areas of economics of particular interest to the Austrian school. The paper is orga-
nized as follows: following this brief introduction, Dewey’s philosophy is outlined 
in part 2, “Dewey’s Pragmatism and the Transactional Strategy;” next, the trans-
actional view is applied to two important problems in modern economic theory in 
part 3, “The Subject-Object Distinction in Economics” and part 4, “Entrepreneur-
ship and Equilibria;” followed finally by part 5, the “Conclusion.”
Dewey’s Pragmatism and the Transactional Strategy
Dewey’s philosophical methodology, the transactional strategy or transactional 
view, aims at breaking down problematical dualisms (Dewey 1938a:5).3 Examples 
of problematic dualisms reconceptualized with the transactional strategy include 
mind versus body, organism versus environment, stimulus versus response, subject 
versus object, meaning versus context, etc. In Dewey’s view, the strict ontological 
separation implied by these rigidly dichotomous pairings can be highly mislead-
ing. With the example of mind and body, it remains unclear where one stops and 
the other begins. Generally, one cannot exist or be defined or imagined without 
the other—there can be no organism in the absence of an environment, and no 
environment in the absence of organisms, no subject without an object and vice 
versa, and so on (Palmer 2004; 2005:11–13). 
Palmer (2005) uses the phrase “transactional strategy” to describe Dewey’s 
approach to problematical dualisms, separations, or oppositions. The transac-
tional strategy consists of two phases. In the first phase, the purported ontological 
separations are reinterpreted as functional distinctions, which are always tentative 
and often arbitrary (Dewey 1925:9). Functional distinctions are better viewed as 
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inherently tentative rather than absolute and ontological; however, they can re-
tain tremendous power and practical efficacy as functional distinctions with the 
status of working conjectures. The tentative nature of arbitrary definitions or dis-
tinctions was, in practice, often substituted with a permanent and absolute, neo-
Platonic essence. 
The second phase of the transactional strategy attempts to frame a reconcili-
ation4 of the former ontologically distinct dualism by envisioning the two sides of 
each functional distinction as aspects of a more inclusive, encompassing whole, a 
transaction. Transactions recognize that the two parts are not really separate, usu-
ally because one cannot exist or even be defined without reference to the other, and 
that the functional distinction is an arbitrary one made for our convenience. In 
other words, a functional distinction is problem-driven—it is defined in relation to 
what we are trying to achieve within a given inquiry. Among the functional distinc-
tions Dewey reconciled within transactions were (a) body and mind within action, 
(b) organism and environment within life-activity, (c) stimulus and response within 
coordination, and (d) designation and existence within fact (Palmer 2005).
In Dewey’s view, it is a mistake to treat conceptual distinctions, separations, 
divisions, dualisms, dichotomies, etc., as something ontological, observer-inde-
pendent, and existing prior to observation—which is not to say that conceptual 
distinctions are not real in other senses, for example, as assertions warranted on 
the basis of past inquiries. Conceptual distinctions are only subjective,5 not onto-
logical; that is, they can never be finally and necessarily real or universal, or can 
never be finally demonstrated as real, universal, and ontologically absolute.6 Palmer 
(2005:2–3) suggests “a distinction is a difference noted, [but] an ontological sepa-
ration is a division assumed to have been there all along.” There is no way for us 
to be objectively certain that differences we note have, in fact, been there all along, 
for in so doing we must note observed differences, and thus involve ourselves. We 
can quite legitimately, however, claim any difference we note as subjective knowl-
edge, a distinction we construct for our own convenience. Economics, however, 
offers a rigorous approach to analyzing the problems of subjective knowledge and 
preference, much like statistics offers a rigorous approach to analyzing the prob-
lems of uncertainty.
Palmer further notes that distinctions are a broader category than separa-
tions (Figure 1). A separation presupposes a distinction, but a distinction does not 
necessarily presuppose a separation. A separation is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a distinction, but a distinction is neither a necessary nor sufficient con-
dition for a separation—things are often distinct without being separate. As long 
as we consider a distinction to be an ontological separation, human understand-
ing is constrained by any limits the separation imposes. The difficulty lies in the 
fact that not all distinctions are necessarily separations. Viewing the separation as 
a tentative working distinction liberates us from this particular limitation (Dewey 
1925:9). Working distinctions can be modified or abandoned as needed whenever 
they fail the practical test of utility.
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Figure 1. The Relationship between Separations and Distinctions
The Subject-Object Distinction in Economics
In economics, individuals and their institutional extensions, households, firms, 
labor unions, governments, government agencies, etc., are the subjects which con-
struct and revise entrepreneurial plans, conferring value on physical objects.7 The 
subject-object dichotomy is alive and well in modern economics, and seems to be 
as indispensable as it is central to the discipline. Goods possess value not because it 
is an objective, physical, or intrinsic property of the goods themselves, but because 
of judgments and expectations which differ from person to person and for the same 
person at different times (Mises 1960:93–97; compare with Dewey 1925:319–328). 
The objects and their physical characteristics are not thought to have any economic 
significance apart from the subjective valuation and expectations of the subjects. 
The subject confers value and meaning on objects of economic activity, planning, 
and exchange. Meaning resides in individuals but evolves socially through inter-
action among individuals. The most familiar medium of this interaction is com-
munication, but economics deals more particularly with the social interaction of 
exchanges of one good for another.
Subject and object are both broad concepts in economics. Since knowledge 
is inherently subjective—it must be known by someone—it may be better to view 
knowledge according to Hayek’s (1945) distinction between knowledge, which is 
subjective and personal, and information, which is universal and objective but also 
much less important.
Economic subjectivists criticize mainstream economics for ignoring issues 
of purpose, intentionality and meaning (Weber 1921; Lachmann 1971; Kirzner 
1992, 2000; Lavoie 1991). If economic actors extract meaning from prices, mar-
ket efficiency calls for minimizing the false signals, noise, or entropy contained in 
price series. In an environment of spontaneously evolved rules and institutions, 
the outcome of a conflict should be well understood in advance, and the informa-
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1949; Ashby 1956:174–176), where each possible outcome i has a probability of oc-
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. The less the uncertainty, the fewer outcomes are possible, the fewer 
the probabilities being summed, and the more concentrated the probability density 
function, that is, the lower the uncertainty surrounding the outcome. Further, the 
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prior probability assessments will accord. This will be in societies where the in-
stitutional conditions for entrepreneurship are best satisfied (Harper 1998, 2003), 
though entrepreneurs can also benefit by having prior assessments which differ 
from the mainstream (Casson 1987, 1995). 
If mathematical formalism could solve real-world problems, economists 
could go far beyond Debreu (1959) in applying rigorous techniques (Gödel 1931; 
Nagel and Newman 1958; Gellert et al. 1975). Instead, mainstream economics si-
multaneously glorifies empiricism and axiomatization: “. . . economics has become 
more and more formal, more and more instrumental, and more and more precise 
about areas that are of less and less importance to anybody” (Boettke, Lavoie, and 
Storr 2004:3). In addition mainstream economics has long ceased to be empirical 
in any sense which can have practical relevance or can meaningfully inform pub-
lic policy (Boettke, Lavoie, and Storr 2004:20; see also Hutt 1936; Philbrook 1953; 
Coase 1975; Klein 1999). 
To Dewey, meaning resides in individuals but evolves primarily through 
interaction among individuals, a fundamentally cultural activity.8 But economics 
emphasizes the individual subjective decision. The transactional strategy attempts 
to resolve contradictions introduced by viewing the subject-object distinction as an 
ontological absolute, by (a) viewing the separation as a tentative working distinction 
(Dewey 1925:9) and (b) attempting to describe this distinction within an encompass-
ing concept which includes both parts and their connection or relationship (Dewey 
1938a:5; Dewey and Bentley 1949:136).9 In the context of economics, subject and 
object are related within want satisfaction, a concept comprising both subjective 
valuation and objective exchange.10 Objects have economic significance only when 
they can satisfy the subjective wants of economic actors. Thus, given the limited, 
technical use of the term “subjectivity” by economists (Lavoie 1991; O’Neill 2000), 
Austrian radical subjectivism is a special case of Dewey’s ways of knowing. 
Menger (1871, 1883) adopted an Aristotelian deductive approach to the eco-
nomic issues of social behavior and exchange. Lachmann (1994:246) describes the 
evolution of the Austrian school from a first-stage value subjectivism of consumer 
wants to an increasingly radical second-stage subjectivism of means and ends. Mises 
(1949:21) takes the subjectivity of value as given, and concludes economics can only 
address the appropriateness of various means for attaining given, subjective ends.11 
Mises and Hayek viewed scientific knowledge, even in the social sciences, as assert-
ing and aiming for objective certainty which they viewed as final and ontological. 
Hayek’s view of scientific knowledge presented in The Sensory Order (1952a) and 
The Counterrevolution of Science (1952b)12 was closer to that of the logical positiv-
ists of the Vienna circle (Schlick 1918; Carnap 1928; Nagle and Newman 1958) 
than to Dewey. Hayek’s critique of scientific positivism in The Counterrevolution 
of Science rejected the applicability to the social sciences of the empiricism of the 
natural sciences. 
Dewey clearly appreciated this perspective: “The attempt to secure unity by 
defining the terms of all the sciences in terms of some one science is doomed in ad-
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vance to defeat. In the house which science might build there are many mansions” 
(Dewey 1938c:34). Econometrics and other forms of empirical statistical analysis 
applied in economics fail to address the everyday experience of economic agents 
or even policy makers. Dewey’s claim that “The things of ordinary experience do 
not get enlargement and enrichment of meaning as experience” (1925:8) perfectly 
describes most of the shortcomings of modern empirical economics (Klein 1999). 
Although Hayek was not a positivist in the sense ascribed to Friedman (1953), 
Hayek’s belief in the ontologic character of economic knowledge, which he shared 
with Mises and Menger, also shares the aim for rigorous certitude which charac-
terized logical positivism. 
It is thus somewhat ironic that Hayek rejected logical positivism and most of 
the related research program of modern analytical philosophy. It is clear, however, 
that his rejection of positivism stemmed from his special appreciation of the misap-
plications of empirical methods in his own discipline. Mises’s a priorism, asserting 
and aiming for apodictic certainty, represented a more extreme form of ontological 
objectivism even than Hayek’s. In Dewey’s view, a priori constructs 
being reached by methods that seem to those who employ them rationally 
mandatory are taken to be “real” in and of themselves—and supremely 
real. Then it becomes an insoluble problem why the things of gross, pri-
mary experience, should be what they are or indeed why they should be 
at all. (Dewey 1925:9)
Among those critical of Mises’s position was Dewey scholar and economist E. C. 
Harwood. Harwood’s (1970) review of Mises’s Human Action was dismissive of its 
a priori methodology while simultaneously applauding all of Mises’s conclusions. 
Mises’s position was similar in this regard to that of non-Austrian axiomatists such 
as Debreu (1959), though he joined Hayek in eschewing mathematical formalism.
In Dewey’s view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing 
to the scientific community, offering more profound insight or more efficacious 
practical applications (Dewey 1925:9), that is, new solutions to new problems, 
and/or better solutions to old problems. “Experimental method . . . is the foe of 
every belief that permits habit and wont to dominate invention and discovery, and 
ready-made system to override verifiable fact. Constant revision is the work of ex-
perimental inquiry” (Dewey 1930:156). For Dewey all inquiry is problem-driven, 
though scientists are not merely passive recipients of problems, but often exercise 
entrepreneurial awareness in defining new ones. Thus, all scientific knowledge 
evolves spontaneously, even when this evolution proceeds through a paradigm shift 
or scientific revolution (Kuhn 1957, 1962).13 
Because the subject-object distinction in philosophy—of which the subject-
object distinction in economics is a special case—is one of Dewey’s identified prob-
lematical dualisms which the transactional strategy aims to resolve, the Austrian 
school is confronted with a fairly intractable contradiction. According to Hayek 
(1945) knowledge is subjective, but the subject-object distinction is only a tentative, 
ad hoc construct (Dewey 1925:9).
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The radical subjectivism of the Austrian school leads to the contradictory 
conclusion that the market knowledge of entrepreneurial planners, including con-
sumer preferences, is subjective, but the scientific knowledge of economists is ob-
jective, at least provided it is correct. In other words, the knowledge of economics 
supposedly has the property that it may be objectively true or false, and purports 
to occupy a higher level of understanding than the subjective knowledge of market 
participants. Scientific knowledge asserts an ontological absolute. Dewey’s trans-
actional strategy offers a way out of this seeming contradiction—from a Deweyan 
perspective, the “truths” of any scientific discipline, not only economics, are al-
ways tentative, contextual, and subject to further refinement (Dewey 1925), and 
thus subjective in precisely the same way as are the preferences and knowledge 
of market participants. Scientific knowledge occupies a higher level of generality 
than the market knowledge of entrepreneurial planners, and nearly always offers 
deeper understanding, but can neither be considered nor demonstrated to be on-
tologically superior.14
Both Austrian subjectivism and Dewey’s transactional philosophy justify 
rejection of the mirage of social justice (Hayek 1976). A particularly broad and 
encompassing way to frame Hayek’s critique of social justice is to formulate it in 
terms of Deweyan philosophy. In the Austrian view, our preferences are subjective 
and nonadditive across different individuals (Barnett 2003).15 The nonadditivity of 
individual preferences results from preferences being subjective in the first sense. 
Thus, we cannot substitute a hypothesized social preference or welfare function 
approximating the average of individual preferences; we can only substitute the 
preferences of one idealized individual. In the pursuit of so-called social justice, 
one problem is that there is literally nothing to aim for. Two individuals’ prefer-
ences cannot be added or averaged because preferences are subjective. In the name 
of improving the welfare of all, what Hayek (1976) called the mirage of social justice 
serves not real individuals’ preferences, but in the name of scientific rigor, serves 
objective, idealized preferences which belong to nobody. The others who are con-
strained from pursuing their own happiness are necessarily made worse off. This 
criticism is independent of the fact that coercion has to be applied,16 the second 
problem with social justice.
Deweyan knowledge as ways of knowing suggests a broader and more funda-
mental critique of the socialist position in the calculation debate (Stalebrink 2004). 
The Austrian school asserted that socialist economic planning, far from being more 
scientific than capitalist market organization, could never approach the effectiveness 
of the decentralized planning of the free market. A government planning agency 
cannot make use of the amount of information used to set prices through a spon-
taneously organized market, because markets utilize dispersed information sum-
marized in prices but which cannot otherwise be collected by a central planning 
agency. Dewey acknowledged central economic planning as a fact of life, and pre-
ferred it be directed through democratic political institutions rather than through 
corporations motivated by profit (Dewey 1930:101–120). Corporate-dominated 
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planning was too centralized to appeal to Dewey, and through democratic partici-
pation, Dewey felt government planning could be sufficiently decentralized to avoid 
being so oppressive. This position puts him on the opposite side of the calculation 
debate from the Austrian school. However, as a non-economist, Dewey probably 
would have viewed issues of centralized versus decentralized economic calculation 
as narrowly technical with little relevance to his own political views. 
Fundamentally, if knowledge cannot be shared across individuals in an ab-
solutely rigorous, ontological sense, like that sought by logical positivism, there 
can never be any basis for one individual to impose entrepreneurial planning on 
another, whether the planning implements the planner’s preferences or an ideal-
ized projection of the hypothesized social mean. Dewey had some sympathy for 
mild forms of social planning (Ryan 1995:110–117). His criticisms of capitalism 
and corporatism emphasized the need for greater democratic participation to bal-
ance the undue power exercised by concentrated wealth. This raises the issue of 
whether social progress should be better realized through a spontaneously emer-
gent market order, in which all exchanges (transactions) are voluntary, or through 
the instrument of coercively imposed government intervention. The government 
which intervenes with force may equally well be a democracy with unlimited ma-
jority rule as an unlimited dictatorship.
Hypothetically, one individual might be able to make others better off, if 
he could force them to make different choices, but he would have to know their 
preferences with absolute certainty. It remains unclear whether we know our own 
preferences with the requisite certainty, because choice in real time is always an 
experimental process. It also remains unclear why force could be permissible, and 
whether the use of force in this context subverts choice to the extent it overrides 
any temporal gain in hypothesized utility. Boettke (1993, 1994a, 1994b) notes that 
the transition of the formerly planned economies after the collapse of communism 
was badly flawed by an effort to dictate the outcome. Mapping out the transition 
process implies central planning and precludes the emergence of a spontaneous 
order, precisely what was called for to allow these societies to advance.
To summarize, the transactional approach allows economics to clarify its use 
of the subject-object distinction. Subjectivism in the social sciences is a technical 
approach which emphasizes the subjective bases for human behavior, but clearly 
does not deny the reality of objective characteristics or phenomena. Next, we ap-
ply the transactional approach to a narrower concepts within economics, the role 
of entrepreneurs in maintaining market equilibria. 
Entrepreneurship and Equilibria
This section explicates and reconciles three theories of entrepreneurship within the 
Austrian tradition,17 those of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950), Ludwig Lachmann 
(1906–1990), and Israel M. Kirzner (1930– ), focusing on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial action and market equilibria. The transactional strategy offers the 
possibility of formulating a definitive Austrian theory of the entrepreneur. Equilib-
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rium is a central concept in economic analysis, yet it appears unlikely to ever occur 
in reality (Nelson and Winter 1982; Makowski and Ostroy 2001). Thus, equilib-
rium in economic theory seems to introduce a large number of Deweyan “blocks 
to inquiry, blind alleys . . . puzzles rather than problems, solved only by calling 
the original material of primary experience, ‘phenomenal,’ mere appearance, mere 
impressions, or by some other disparaging name” (Dewey 1925:9). Addressing the 
best place of equilibrium and disequilibrium in economic analysis must be done, 
and is an imperative cutting across different ideological positions and schools of 
economic thought, which “in spite of the diverse subjects to which it applies, and 
the consequent diversity of its special techniques [methodology] has a common 
structure . . . that is applied both in common sense and science. . . . The controlled 
or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so de-
terminate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements 
of the original situation into a unified whole . . .” (Dewey 1938b:105). Dewey was 
not trained in economics, and clearly failed to appreciate the role of entrepreneur-
ial planning in coordinating production (Dewey 1930:134–136), though he did 
appreciate the application of applied science in operating industrial production 
(Dewey 1938c:30). 
In economics, an equilibrium price is one which clears the market for a par-
ticular good and equates the quantity supplied with the quantity demanded. Prices 
higher than the equilibrium result in surpluses, which impel alert price-setters 
to lower the price. Prices lower than the equilibrium result in shortages, impel-
ling price-setters to raise the price. Though markets may never clear perfectly or 
completely, there always exists a tendency toward equilibrium if the price-setters 
respond to incentives, because when markets clear, sellers earn higher profits, and 
buyers attain greater satisfaction compared to when markets fail to clear. Thus the 
implied equilibrium toward which entrepreneurs effect adjustment experimentally 
emerges with the constellations of prices they try out on the market and the plans 
they develop to earn profits through satisfying the wants of others. Lachmann (1947, 
1956, 1971, 1976a, 1976b) focused on entrepreneurial contributions to upsetting 
existing equilibria to bring about better coordination among the planned produc-
tion and consumption activities of autonomous yet interdependent individuals. In 
contrast, Kirzner (1984a) framed a broader concept of entrepreneurial action by 
recognizing that it can be either successful or unsuccessful. Successful entrepre-
neurship improves the coordination of entrepreneurial plans and is equilibrating; 
unsuccessful entrepreneurship is disequilibrating. Entrepreneurial success pre-
dominates because it is rewarded by market incentives.18 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs focus on technological change. They move 
market prices away from equilibrium by introducing new production technolo-
gies, marketing and distribution media, and new plans which increase the social 
dispersion of knowledge (Schumpeter 1911:64). For Schumpeter the entrepreneur 
seeks to shift the production function and cost function (Triffin 1940:168; Schum-
peter 1962:104–105, 132). To Lachmann (1976a, 1976b), entrepreneurship is a much 
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broader concept, because Lachmannian entrepreneurs also change market condi-
tions even when they are not introducing new technologies:
. . . the equilibrating forces, operating slowly, especially where much of the 
capital equipment is durable and specific, are always overtaken by unex-
pected change before they have done their work. . . . What emerges from 
our reflections is an image of the market as a particular kind of process, 
a continuous process without beginning or end, propelled by the interac-
tion between the forces of equilibrium and the forces of change. (Lach-
mann 1976b:61)
Though a plan may be intended to offer flexibility and be adaptable to chang-
ing market conditions, planning always imposes some degree of inflexibility by 
limiting future choices. In Kirzner’s (1973: 72–73; 1976) view, successful entrepre-
neurs discover previously unsuspected disequilibria and profit from their removal.19 
Kirzner notes that prices remain in equilibrium until alert entrepreneurs discover 
information dispersal and asymmetry and act to take advantage of the arbitrage 
opportunity. Kirznerian entrepreneurs, when successful, establish a new equilib-
rium where market participants’ plans are better coordinated and their wants can 
be better satisfied than before (Kirzner 1984b:160). Kirznerian entrepreneurs profit 
through alertness to new opportunities unsuspected by others: “entrepreneurship 
for me is not so much the introduction of new products or of new techniques of 
production as the ability to see where new products have become unexpectedly 
valuable to consumers and where new methods of production have, unknown to 
others, become feasible” (Kirzner 1973: 81). 
The Schumpeterian and Lachmannian entrepreneurs disturb and destroy the 
old equilibrium; the successful Kirznerian entrepreneur moves the market toward a 
new one. Kirznerian entrepreneurs avoid risk and cost (Blaug 1998:223) because they 
move the market toward a new equilibrium which could only exist hypothetically 
after the entrepreneurial action. Kirzner on the one hand, and Schumpeter and Lach-
mann on the other, offer diametrically opposed views of the role of the entrepreneur 
in relation to market equilibria (table 1). The actual dispersion of the asymmetric 
information introduced by Schumpeterian and Lachmannian entrepreneurs lessens 
the coordination of economic plans. Kirznerian entrepreneurs exercise alertness to 
discover these already-existing information asymmetries, and when their plans are 
successful, serve to improve the coordination among others’ plans. Figure 2 illustrates 
the relationships among the three authors’ concepts of entrepreneurship.
The true market environment in which an entrepreneur operates can only be 
discovered through experience, but by then it is too late, because the entrepreneur-
ial plan has already been carried out, and has failed. This first kind of knowledge 
problem (Kirzner’s Knowledge Problem A), a problem of overoptimism, causes 
planned exchanges to be impossible to fulfill. Kirzner (1990:169–171) notes over-
optimism is self-correcting, as market participants either adjust their plans to the 
realities of the market, or withdraw from the market. 
It is also possible for entrepreneurs to come to the erroneous conclusions that 
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inputs cannot be obtained, or output sold, at sufficiently low or high prices, or that 
production technology, input quality, or consumer demand for the output are ac-
tually better than anticipated by entrepreneurial planners (Kirzner 1990:168–69). 
In these instances of overpessimism (Kirzner’s Knowledge Problem B), exchanges 
which are theoretically feasible, and could be seen after the fact to have been fea-
sible, are never planned or undertaken, because market participants were unaware 
of the feasibility of the potential exchanges. Entrepreneurs always seek to discover 
such opportunities, but many must go undiscovered. These kinds of problems are 
not self-correcting, and await entrepreneurial discovery before anyone can be aware 
Table 1. Alternative Theories of Equilibria and Entrepreneurship
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Figure 2. Entrepreneurship and Equilibria
of them. The entrepreneur can profit by uncovering, and remedying, instances of 
Knowledge Problem B.
These objections based on Kirzner’s two knowledge problems can be given 
an alternative formulation, drawing mainly from Hayek (1949) and Kirzner (1984a, 
1984b, 1990): the information set required for optimizing behavior does not exist 
in reality. In reality, each market participant possesses some relevant information, 
much of which is purely subjective. Much of this information is held exclusively by 
a certain individual, for example, that individual’s subjective preferences or his or 
her plans for future consumption and production, which no one else can observe 
before the fact. Some information, such as undiscovered technical knowledge, is 
always waiting to be discovered, but until someone uncovers and acts on new in-
formation, resource allocation is always less optimal and always imposes greater 
material scarcity on economic agents. Individuals also differ in their alertness, 
both in terms of intensity and application (Kirzner 1979:170). Entrepreneurs over-
come the social problem of information dispersal whenever they generate flows 
of information that stimulate revision of uncoordinated decisions toward greater 
mutual coordination (Kirzner 1984a:147) moving the market toward a never-real-
ized equilibrium state. 
Prices summarize relevant information which would otherwise be useless 
to market participants in satisfying their wants, but inadequacies in market prices 
also create the profit-and-loss incentives for entrepreneurs to adjust prices. Entre-
preneurs compete in adjusting prices in a “competitive process which digs out what 
is in fact discovered” (Kirzner 1984a:150). The competitive process where “com-
petition is valuable only because, and so far as, its results are unpredictable and on 
the whole different from those which anyone has, or could have, deliberately aimed 
at” (Hayek 1978:180) is incompatible with central planning.
Because Austrian business cycle theory is built on the concept of produc-
tion or capital structure, the role entrepreneurial managers play in adjusting and 
maintaining the production structure connects Austrian macroeconomics with 
Austrian microeconomics (Dulbecco and Garrouste 1999). Baetjer (1997, 2000) 
notes the need to coordinate production through the capital structure is ongoing 
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production structure is maintained through experimental revisions of entrepre-
neurial plans. “Constant revision is the work of experimental inquiry” (Dewey 
1930:156). These adjustments are always experimental because the outcome can-
not be known in advance: “The uncertainty of the future is already implied in the 
very notion of action” (Mises 1949:105). Baetjer emphasizes that capital equipment 
calls for complementary technical knowledge and other resources. Capital is use-
less if workers do not know how to use it and if complementary capital is not avail-
able, e.g., a locomotive cannot be operated by a layperson, and cannot run without 
tracks.20 Maintaining the production structure is a dynamic, disequilibrium process 
(Lewin 1999:22–25; Lewin and Phelan 2000:68).
Each stage of production is filled with half-baked cakes (Kirzner 1997:37–41). 
Individual entrepreneurial errors are common, occurring often and randomly 
(Rothbard 1997:73; Mueller 2001:13). Because the production structure cannot 
constantly readjust without significant cost, once entrepreneurs have implemented 
a production plan, they may resist revising it, and may even resist alertness to new 
information which calls for revising a production plan once it has been implemented 
(Kirzner 1973:35, 64–68, 1992:26–28; Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
Conclusion
Austrian radical subjectivism is presented as a special case of Dewey’s ways of 
knowing or transactional strategy. The Austrian economists generally view the 
economic knowledge of market participants as subjective, but view the scientific 
knowledge of economics as asserting and aiming for ontologic certainty. Correct 
scientific knowledge would thus possess an objective character. Dewey views scien-
tific knowledge as tentative and non-ontologic. Because Menger, Mises, and Hayek 
all accepted the possibility that scientific knowledge, if correct, could possess a final, 
objective, and even apodictic certainty, their view was closer to that of the logical 
positivists of the Vienna circle than to Dewey’s pragmatism. In Dewey’s view, the 
scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the scientific community, 
offering more profound insight or more efficacious practical applications. In spite 
of diametrically opposite positions on the status of scientific knowledge, both the 
radical subjectivism of the Austrian school and Dewey’s transactional philosophy 
justify rejection of central economic planning. The Deweyan transactional strategy, 
knowledge as ways of knowing, suggests a broader and more fundamental critique 
of the socialist position in the calculation debate. 
Dewey’s transactional philosophy is applied to several problems in modern 
economics. The economic conception of subjectivism was explored and discussed. 
Though subjective valuation is central to the economic approach to analyzing be-
havior, the concept is effectively limited to the social sciences. Thus, the radical 
subjectivism of the Austrian school is too limited in scope to conflict significantly 
with Dewey’s transactional view. Dewey’s view, that subject and object are con-
nected through transaction, transcends the narrow technical meaning of subject 
and object applied in the social sciences. Spontaneous order characterizes most 
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economic phenomena, and indeed, most phenomena resulting from social interac-
tion or transaction. Spontaneously evolved institutions include government, laws, 
markets, and money. Spontaneous order explains why economics can be seen as 
a rigorous approach to the phenomena of subjectivity, much like statistics offers a 
mathematically rigorous approach to uncertainty and indeterminacy.
Dewey’s transactional strategy was applied to clarify several problems in the 
theory of entrepreneurship. Examining the meaning and significance of hypoth-
esized market equilibria and how entrepreneurs potentially can profit from disturb-
ing or establishing coordination among the entrepreneurial plans of individuals 
offers a richer understanding of entrepreneurs’ contribution to social progress. Dif-
ferent and apparently conflicting theories of entrepreneurship were demonstrated 
to be related as special and general cases. 
The Deweyan transactional approach is essential for removing roadblocks to 
inquiry that would otherwise frustrate the progress of the social sciences. Econom-
ics analyzes problems of social communication through spontaneously emergent 
institutions. Market prices summarize the information entrepreneurial planners 
can use to coordinate their future productive activity against an indeterminate 
world of uncertainty. An essential part of economic analysis has to be the valid in-
terpretation and contextualization of what economics asserts, calling for applica-
tion of Dewey’s transactional strategy.
Notes
Financial support of the American Institute for Economic Research is gratefully acknowledged. 
Thanks are due to Dan Palmer, Elias Khalil, Frank X. Ryan, and two anonymous referees, 
who commented on earlier versions of this paper. The author remains responsible for all 
shortcomings. 
1. “Inquiry, through linguistic development of terms and propositions, arrives in 
judgment at warranted assertions upon existence” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:165). “Final 
judgment is attained through a series of partial judgments—those to which the name estimates 
or appraisals has been given. Judgment is not something occurring all at once. Since it is a 
manifestation of inquiry, it cannot be instantaneous and yet be inquiry. Short of attainment 
of a finally resolved situation (the result of final judgment and assertion) respective subject-
and-predicate contents are provisionally instituted in distinction from and correlation with 
each other. Were subject-and-predicate contents final rather than provisional, distinction 
and relation would constitute a state of irreconcilable opposition. Since they are functional 
and operative, there is no more conflict than there is in the fact that in the course of every 
complex productive activity, industrial or social, divisions of labor are instituted which 
nevertheless are functionally connected with one another” (Dewey 1938b:133–134). This 
argues strongly that Dewey is subjectivist in the sense of the Austrian school: “Final judgment 
is individual . . .” and refers to “a situation in the sense in which the meaning of that word has 
been explained; it is a qualitative existential whole which is unique” (Dewey 1938b:122). 
2. Dan Palmer suggests that the more desired, hoped-for, or important a warranted 
assertion that resolves a problematic situation, the more important the means employed 
to arrive at it. A further consideration is that within inquiry, ends often become means to 
subsequent ends. One inquirer’s end may be another’s mid-journey milestone, a possibility 
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given particularly eloquent expression by Isaac Newton (1675): “If I have seen further . . . it 
is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” 
3. “Knowings and knowns are to be taken together as aspects of one event” (Dewey 
and Bentley 1949:127). Ryan (1995:113) discusses the relationship of Dewey’s philosophy 
to that of Hegel and Marx. 
4. The term “reconciliation” is potentially misleading because it can be taken to imply a 
prior separateness. The goal of inquiry is to clarify the way in which two sides of a functional 
distinction were never apart. Thus, the problem of their reconciliation is illusory. The author 
is indebted to Dan Palmer for this interpretation. 
5. Concepts are not physical objects as in Platonic idealism (nor are they supernatural), 
thus concepts cannot have any existence independent of the individual subjective beliefs of a 
knower. Even so, from a transactional perspective, the distinctions are equally subjective and 
objective, both being two phases of a single knowing transaction. Distinctions are facts in 
the etymologically original sense of factum or things done, and thus possess objective reality 
in this strictly limited sense, where the thing and the doing are present simultaneously. The 
objectivity of one’s knowledge is limited by the sum of knowledge and belief accepted by a 
particular individual. From the perspective of economics, the subjectivity of an individual’s 
knowledge is fairly overriding, even when many individuals accept the same knowledge as 
“truth.” To say that things distinguished are “only subjective,” as economists still speak of 
human valuation, is not representative of Dewey and Bentley’s views. Dewey replaces the stage 
of ontology with the stage of inquiry, not with the stage of subjectivism. In Dewey’s thought, 
to reject the extreme of a traditional dualism is rarely if ever to embrace the other extreme 
(here subjectivism). The point economics makes is more that the objective characteristics 
of a good, service, or entrepreneurial plan are relatively unimportant (from an economic 
perspective) and subordinated to individuals’ subjective valuation. Economists do not hold 
that objective characteristics do not exist, or that subjective valuation, such as it exists at any 
time in reality, is not an objective fact. 
6. “It was assumed that . . . knowledge is dependent upon the independent existence 
of a knower and of something to be known; occurring, that is, between mind and the world; 
between self and not-self; or in words made familiar by use, between subject and object. The 
assumption consisted in holding that the subject matters designated by these antithetical 
terms are separate and independent; hence, the problem of problems was to determine some 
method of harmonizing the status of one with the status of the other with respect to the 
possibility and nature of knowledge” (Dewey and Bentley 1949:287–288).
7. The subjectivity of human experience is called the Rashomon effect, from Akira 
Kurosawa’s (1910–1998) 1950 film based on the short stories of Ryunosuke Akutagawa 
(1892–1927).
Non-physical objects like processes, systems, entrepreneurial plans, technical knowledge, 
and administrative procedures can also be valued by individuals. Dewey would point out 
correctly that these are also objects (Dewey and Bentley 1949:194–196), since they can be real 
without necessarily possessing corporeality. Dewey discourages use of the words “subject,” 
“subjective,” and “subjectivism,” but they seem to be necessary technical terms in modern 
economics. In more Deweyan language, we might say individuals (subjects) and external 
reality (objects) are related through (subjective) valuation, and different individuals are 
related (objectively) through exchange. See note 10 below on the Austrian school’s distinction 
between objective exchange value and subjective use value. Dewey might object that these 
two kinds of valuation cannot really be separated, and that the Austrian distinction is merely 
a conceptual schema.
8. “The environment in which human beings live, act, and inquire, is not simply 
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physical. It is cultural as well. Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relation of 
fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with theses relations are not only the 
eye and ear, but the meanings which have developed in the course of living, together with the 
ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents of tools, arts, institutions, 
traditions, and customary beliefs. . . . Man, as Aristotle remarked, is a social animal. This fact 
introduces him into situations and originates problems and ways of solving them that have 
no precedent upon the organic biological level. For man is social in another sense than the 
bee and the ant, since his activities are encompassed in an environment that is culturally 
transmitted, so that what man does and how he acts, is determined not by organic structure, 
and physical heredity alone but by the influence of cultural heredity, embedded in traditions, 
institutions, customs, and the purposes and beliefs they both carry and inspire” (Dewey 
1938a:48–49).
9. “Transaction . . . represents that late level of inquiry in which in which observation 
and presentation could be carried on without attribution of the aspects and phases of action 
to independent self-actors, or to independently inter-acting elements or relations” (Dewey 
and Bentley 1949:136). 
10. Menger (1871:118–121) and Mises (1912:38–45; 1949:120–121) distinguish 
subjective use value, which is unobservable and internal to the individual, from objective 
exchange value, which is both observable and external. This distinction was central to the 
Austrian school, but continues to be almost universally accepted in other schools of economic 
thought. See note 7 for discussion of a transactional resolution of this distinction. 
11. Mises (1949:47-48; 1960:35–37, 57) regards scientific knowledge as value-free (wert-
frei) because it would be true regardless of an individual’s values. This is particularly true for 
economic theory which addresses the fulfillment of human wants or values, but not their 
ultimate source or justification. Goods can be used either to satisfy an individual’s wants 
(subjective use-value) or for exchange (objective exchange-value). 
12. Hayek (1952b:374) cites Marx, Engels, Feuerbach, Renan, Taine, Durkheim, Mazzini, 
Croce, Proudhon, and Pareto along with Dewey as accepting a social theory of Comte and 
Hegel that our material understanding of scientific technology governs and limits our 
development in all other fields. 
13. “The transactional is in fact that point of view which systematically proceeds upon 
the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication” 
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:97). “No scientific inquirer can keep what he finds to himself or 
turn it to merely private account without losing his scientific standing. Everything discovered 
belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this 
community for confirmation and test” (Dewey 1930:154). 
14. In physics, Newtonian mechanics was superseded by Einsteinian relativity. Although 
Newtonian mechanics remains as true as it ever was in its limited context, and being a special 
case, is nested within Einsteinian physics, we often say that the truth of Einsteinian physics 
demonstrates the falsity of Newtonian physics. It remains impossible for us to know if 
Einsteinian relativity will ever be superseded—we cannot know that it is not ontologically 
final truth, and we cannot know that it is. 
Similarly, the familiar Euclidian geometry of everyday experience is nested within 
several alternative non-Euclidian geometries of Gauss (1777–1855), Lobachevskii (1792–
1856), Bólyai (1802–1850), Riemann (1826–1866), and the projective geometry of Cayley 
(1821–1895) and Kline (1849–1925). The non-Euclidian geometries are not nested within 
one another, and some are mutually exclusive. Euclidean geometry is nested within each 
as a special case, and each of the non-Euclidean geometries are nested within Kline’s more 
general system (Gellert et al. 1975:712–717). 
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Section 4 shows how Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship is nested within 
Lachmann’s more general theory, which is nested in turn within Kirzner’s (Figure 2).
15. Human choice and preference have to be viewed as objective in the sense “that 
man and his doings and transactions have to be viewed as facts within the natural cosmos” 
(Dewey and Bentley 1949:116). When economists say human preference is subjective, they 
merely mean that each person’s value scale is unique to the individual. Even if, by chance, 
two individuals shared identical preferences, economists would appeal to the inherent 
separateness of the two individuals, an objective property, to demonstrate the difference of 
their preferences. In economics, Jack’s and Jill’s preferences are different, even when they have 
the same content, because they belong to two different individuals. 
Barnett (2003) gives a comprehensive critique of preference-additivity. A modern area 
of research in consumer theory involves using the utility of others as an argument in utility 
functions (Postlewaite 1998; Bergstrom 1999). This formulation potentially breaks down the 
presumed separateness of individual utilities, but not their inherently subjective character. 
Utility independence was traditionally assumed for analytical tractability.
16. Dewey was unfortunately ambiguous regarding the permissibility of coercion. 
“Whether the use of force is justified or not . . . is, in substance, a question of efficiency 
(including economy) of means in the accomplishment of ends” (Dewey 1916:362, cited by 
Hayek 1973:160, note 4). Dewey’s position contrasts sharply with Mises’s characterization 
of the social sciences as value-free (wertfrei); to Mises and Hayek, force could never be 
initiated, but could only be applied as a defensive response to the force of others. See also 
Hayek (1960:17; 1976:44). Dewey (1935:41; 1938a:74) even suggests that liberty is liberty to 
exercise force over others.
17. Schumpeter is not always considered a member of the Austrian school, however, 
his theory of the entrepreneur was highly influential and controversial among both Austrian 
and mainstream economists. For a good part of Schumpeter’s career, roughly c. 1900–1940, 
the Austrian school was the mainstream.
18. General equilibrium is a hypothetical macroeconomic condition in which all 
markets for goods and services are simultaneously in equilibrium. Among the functions 
entrepreneurs fulfill in market economies, they experiment with different prices and are alert 
to the shortages and surpluses which follow. Shortages and surpluses offer alert entrepreneurs 
valuable information for the next round of experimental price-setting.
19. On this important distinction between Kirzner and Lachmann, see especially Lewin 
(1999:22–25).
20. Lachmann (1947/1977:199), Lewin (1999:123–125), and Cochran (2001:22) make 
a similar point. 
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